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TIME TO PAY UP: INTERNET
SERVICE PROVIDERS' UNIVERSAL
SERVICE OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ACT OF 1996
by JAmiE N.

I.

NAFZIGERt

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, Congress enacted the most comprehensive reform of telecommunications law in over fifty years. Part of this reform fundamentally changed the structure of Universal Service-the policy that
everyone in the United States should have access to a telephone. Prior to
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), programs to implement Universal Service were funded by cross-subsidies within local telephone companies and by access charges imposed on subscribers and
carriers. The 1996 Act changes the funding base for Universal Service
by requiring all telecommunications carriers to contribute to Universal
Service.
This change was necessary because the 1996 Act opens all telecommunications to competition, including local telecommunications. Since
local telephone companies must now compete, they can no longer afford
to maintain some of the cross-subsidies that traditionally funded Universal Service. In addition, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") recently removed most access charge funding of Universal Service and has begun to implement a new Universal Service funding
mechanism.
The FCC has never specifically been granted jurisdiction to regulate
the Internet. However, the Communications Act of 1934 gives the FCC
broad jurisdiction-it directs the FCC to regulate "interstate and foreign
commerce in communication by wire and radio."1 Since information on
t A.B., Stanford University; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley. Ms. Nafziger, is an intellectual property litigation associate with the law firm of
Dorsey & Whitney, LLP in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1997).
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the Internet mainly travels over telephone wires, it probably constitutes
"communication by wire." Thus, under the Communications Act of 1934,
the FCC can assert jurisdiction to regulate the Internet. The FCC is cur2
rently considering how it should govern the Internet.
This article discusses the Internet governance issue of whether the
FCC should require Internet service providers ("ISPs") to contribute to
Universal Service. ISPs have been exempt from paying access charges
and contributing to Universal Service since access charges were first imposed in 1983. The FCC is currently revisiting the ISP exemption. This
article argues that the FCC should terminate the ISP exemption. As information and communications technologies converge, the FCC's service
distinctions no longer make sense. The FCC needs a new, unified approach that obligates all who transmit information on the network, including ISPs, to contribute to Universal Service. In addition, failure to
terminate the ISP exemption would create new incentives to bypass the
telephone system and avoid Universal Service-related charges. Bypass
is already occurring with the new Internet phone software. Since the
1996 Act attempts to solve the traditional bypass problem, the FCC
should not create a new bypass problem by exempting a single type of
carrier from Universal Service obligations.
Part II of this article reviews the history of Universal Service funding. It also describes the problems with Universal Service prior to the
1996 Act, such as the unclear signals sent by using implicit, internal subsidies to fund Universal Service, the lack of narrow targeting within Universal Service programs, and the bypass problem caused by exempting
some carriers from contributing to Universal Service. Part II further discusses the recent attempts by Congress and the FCC to solve these
problems by making all subsidies explicit, targeting subsidy recipients
more carefully, and imposing Universal Service obligations on all telecommunications carriers to eliminate incentives to bypass the telephone
system.
Part III reviews the history of the Internet. It also describes how the
Internet works and how ISPs use the public telephone system in their
business.
Part IV explains the origin of the ISPs' access charge exemption.
Part IV also discusses the main arguments propounded by ISPs for why
2. See Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and TelecommunicationsPolicy
(Mar. 1997) <httpJ/www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp29.pdf> (analyzing
the FCC's policy making role in regard to the Internet); In re Access Charge Reform, 11
F.C.C.R. 21, 354, at sec.x (released Dec.24, 1996) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Third
Report and Order, and Notice of Inquiry) [hereinafter Access Charge NPRM] (initiating an
FCC notice of inquiry on the implications of information service and Internet usage and
seeking comments on the costs Internet service providers impose on the telephone network
and on whether Internet service providers should have Universal Service obligations).
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their exemption should be maintained-that ISPs are not covered by the
text of the 1996 Act and that imposing access charges and Universal Service obligations on ISPs would stunt the Internet's growth. Finally, Part
IV argues that the FCC should terminate the ISP exemption so that all
technologies are treated equally and so that new forms of bypass are
discouraged.
II.
A.

UNIVERSAL SERVICE

THE IMPORTANCE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE

Universal Service has been an accepted policy goal in the United
States for over sixty years. During those sixty years, programs to further Universal Service have fairly successfully met their goals. The FCC
reported that as of November 1996, 93.9% of U.S. households had telephone service. 3 However, that 93.9% is not evenly distributed among
households. People who live in urban areas, and who are young, lower
income, and African-American or Hispanic are less likely to have access
4
to a phone.

Universal Service is important both for those who receive the subsidies that allow them to have a telephone and for everyone else in the
United States. For those who receive subsidies, access to a telephone is
essential to education, health, and safety. 5 For others, the telephone
network becomes more valuable as more people are connected to it. A
household with a telephone has access to emergency medical services,
law enforcement authorities, and fire departments. 6 This access is important for public health and safety.
In addition to providing health and safety functions, telephones support a democratic society. Democracy is based on decisionmaking by the
public. 7 Telephones give people access to the information necessary to be
an active part of society. They enable people to communicate with their
government and to obtain the information required to participate in the
political process. Telephones also give users access to educational services8 and increase their ability to obtain and retain employment. People
3. FCC, Tel. Subscribership Report, 1997 F.C.C. LEXIS 283 (Jan. 16, 1997).
4. Milton Mueller & Jorge R. Schement, Universal Service from the Bottom Up: A
Profile of Telecommunications Access in Camden, New Jersey, 12 Tu INFO. Soc. 3 (1996).
5. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
61 Fed. Reg. 10,499, 10,503 (Mar. 14, 1996) [hereinafter Universal Service NPRM].
6. Id.
7. KEvN G. WILSON, TEcHNoLoGIEs OF CONTROL: THE NEW INTERACTIVE MEDIA FOR
THE HomE 135 (1988).
8. NATL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFO. ADMIN., NTIA TELECOM 2000: CHARTING
THE COURSE FOR A NEW CENTURY 78 (Oct. 1988) (Special Pub. 88-21) [hereinafter NTIA
TELECOM 20001.
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can call about job listings, and employers can call potential employees
about interviews or job offers.
Communication also reduces feelings of alienation, 9 and allows people to give meaning to their experiences and to participate in forming
communities. 10 As a society, we want all people to participate in their
communities. Thus, an important policy objective is to have telephones
accessible to all, not depending on membership in an economic, social,
political, or other community of interest."
Universal Service is valuable to everyone else on the network as
well. In economic terms, Universal Service creates positive externalities.
Externalities arise whenever a transaction, such as hooking up a telephone, results in costs or benefits for individuals not involved in the
transaction. For example, a neighbor of a person whose house is burning
would benefit from that person being able to call the fire department,
rather than waiting until the fire reaches a house with a telephone.
B.

THE

HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE

The Universal Service concept was originated in the early 1900s by
Theodore Vail, the President of the Bell System. 12 At that time, the Bell
system 13 controlled almost the entire telephone system, having a monopoly in long distance service and telephone equipment and having about a
50% marketshare in local service. Vail believed that everyone should
have access to a telephone for outgoing calls and that a single telephone
company was necessary to meet that goal. He claimed that the telephone
system was a natural monopoly, an industry where the costs of doing
business drop the more business a company does.14 Vail argued therefore, that competing telephone companies simply duplicate services and
thus are inefficient. 15 Vail believed in Universal Service and that it
should be supplied by one company, Bell. 16 Bell's slogan in 1908 was
"One Policy, One System, Universal Service." 17 Bell "funded" Universal
Service by keeping local rates artificially low and by setting business and
9. ROBERT H. ANDERSON ET AL., UNIVERSAL ACCESS To E-MAIL: FEASmILrrY AND Soci-

ETAL IMPLICATIONS 10 (1995), available in <http/www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR650>.
10. WILSON, supra note 7, at 143.
11. Larry L. Learn, The Implications of Recent Telecommunications Developments for
Abstracting and Indexing Services, in THREE VIEWS OF THE INTERNET 7 (1993).
12.

MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw 11 (1992).

13. For clarity, this paper will use "Bell" to refer to the Bell company prior to its divestiture in 1982 and "AT&T"' to refer only to the long-distance company after divestiture.
14. ROBERT B. HoRwrrz, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM: THE DEREGULATION OF
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 99 (1989).

15. Id.
16.

KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 12.

17. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 12, at 12.
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long distance rates artificially high. 18
Congress incorporated Vail's vision of universal access to basic communications into the Federal Communications Act of 1934 ("1934
Act"). 19 The 1934 Act created the FCC to regulate all interstate and foreign communications by wire or radio. Under the 1934 Act, one of the
FCC's purposes was to "make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reason20
able charges."
At the time of the 1934 Act, Bell continued to fund Universal Service
through cross-subsidies in several areas of service: (1) businesses were
charged higher rates than residential customers for the same service; (2)
urban and rural customers were charged the same monthly prices for
basic service even though the cost of providing service in densely populated areas was lower; (3) long distance rates were priced above cost and
local rates were priced below cost by allocating joint and common costs to
long distance; and (4) nationwide rate averaging meant that the price
per call was the same for the same distance even though the cost per call
on heavily used routes was less than the cost per call on lightly used
21
routes.
Competition began making inroads into Bell's monopoly in customer
premises equipment in the late 1940s 2 2 and in interstate long distance in
the late 1950s. 23 In cases regarding this new competition, Bell argued
that allowing competition would lead to "creamskimming." Creamskimming meant that competitors would take Bell's profitable business and
leave Bell with only the customers who were expensive to serve. Bell
claimed that creamskimming would harm Universal Service because
some of Bell's cross-subsidies would no longer work if competition were
18. Ralph J. Andreotta, The National InformationInfrastructure:Its Implications, Opportunities,and Challenges, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 227 (1995).
19. NTIA TELECOM 2000, supra note 8, at 79.
20, Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652 §1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. §151 (1988).
21. THoMAs G. KRArrENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 467 (1994).
22. See Use of Recording Devices in Connection with Telephone Services, 11 F.C.C.
1033 (1947) (striking down Bell tariff provision that prohibited use of recording devices in
connection with interstate service).
23. See Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959),
recon. denied, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960) (allowing company to use microwave signals to transmit
its own long distance telephone traffic); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC [Execunet
I], 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MCI was offering a service where customers could call
MCI using a local line, and MCI would carry the long distance portion of the call. The D.C.
Circuit remanded the case for an explanation of why competition was not in the public

interest).
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allowed. 2 4 Eventually, the FCC began to encourage competition. 2 5 It
also sought to continue inexpensive local rates. However, by permitting
competition, the FCC was
slowing the revenue stream that had sup26
ported Universal Service.
In 1974, the federal government sued Bell alleging antitrust violations in its long distance and equipment businesses. 2 7 In this case, Bell
argued again that it needed to prevent competitors from creamskimming
to protect subsidy flows for Universal Service. 28 The case was finally
settled in 1982.29 District Court Judge Greene reviewed and eventually
approved the settlement known as the Modified Final Judgment
("MFJ"). Under the terms of the settlement, Bell was required to divest
its local telephone companies. AT&T was allowed to keep the equipment
and long distance businesses. The divested local business was split into
seven Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs"). The RBOCs could
not offer long distance, information services, 3 0 or equipment and could
not participate in any competitive business. In addition to imposing
these business restrictions on the RBOCs, the MFJ required the RBOCs
to provide non-discriminatory access to its networks for all long distance
carriers.
Maintaining inexpensive, undisrupted local service was a priority
for Judge Greene. 3 1 However, divestiture necessitated replacement of
the support for Universal Service, which had come from cross-subsidies.
To support Universal Service, the MFJ allowed the RBOCs, under supervision of federal and state regulators, to levy access charges on long distance carriers. These access charges were intended both to cover the
costs of local service, from which long distance carriers benefited through
interconnection, and to continue the subsidies for local rates. 32 The ac-

cess charges were significant. In 1983, the FCC estimated that $7 billion
of revenue was transferred within the Bell system to reduce local service
33
rates.
24. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 12, at 503, 594.
25. See Use of the Carterphone Device in Message Toll Telephone Services, 13
F.C.C.2d 420, recon. denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968) (allowing attachment of any customer
premises equipment that did not adversely affect the telephone system's operation).
26.

LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDusTRY: EVOLUTION

AND ORGANiZATION 151 (1987).
27. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982); afftd,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983).

28. Id. at 161.
29. Id. at 131.
30. The information services restriction was later lifted in United States v. Western
Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
31. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 12, at 388.
32. KRATTENMAKER, supra note 21 at 510.
33. Id. at 467.
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In 1984, the FCC decided to reprice telephone service by imposing a
monthly, flat-rate charge on subscribers to replace part of the interstate
carrier access charge levied on long distance carriers, also known as interexchange carriers ("IXCs"). 3 4 Since then, the Universal Service sysof explicit and implicit
tem has been supported through a combination
35
subsidies that have evolved over time.
C.

PROBLEMS WITH UNIVERSAL SERVICE PRIOR TO THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996

To understand the Universal Service reforms in the 1996 Act, one
must first understand the problems with Universal Service that existed
at the time the law was passed. These problems are described below.
1.

Universal Service Programs Were Funded Through Implicit,
Internal Subsidies

Prior to the passage of the 1996 Act, many of the Universal Service
programs were funded by implicit subsidies that were hidden in access
charges. For instance, some programs like Long Term Support, required
low-cost local telephone companies, also known as local exchange carriers ("LECs"), to subsidize high-cost LECs through the access charge system.3 6 Others, like Link Up America, were funded by shifting LEC costs
to IXCs. 3 7
These internalized subsidies were inconsistent with competition. 38
Requiring IXCs to make large access payments to LECs resulted in all
IXCs having similar cost structures. Thus, the amount of actual and potential price competition was reduced. 39 Since explicit subsidies for Universal Service would give better signals to users and result in
efficiencies, 40 some commentators concluded that implicit, internal subsidies should be eliminated and that all subsidies should be made
explicit.
2.

Universal Service Programs Were Not Narrowly Tailored

Another problem with the Universal Service programs prior to the
1996 Act was that the programs were not narrowly targeted to serve
34. ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERmAN, TALK Is CHEAP: THE PROMISE OF
REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 31 (1995).

35. Andreotta, supra note 18, at 227.

36. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 87, at ' 190
(released Nov. 8, 1996) (recommended decision) [hereinafter Universal Service Recommended Decision].
37. Universal Service NPRM, supra note 5, at 10509.

38. NTIA TELECOM 2000, supra note 8, at 31.
39. Id.
40. HvMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 179.
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those with actual financial need. For instance, all local residential rates
were subsidized by assigning a disproportionate burden of the costs to
toll and business services. 4 ' Thus, under Universal Service prior to the
1996 Act, multiple lines going into a home would be subsidized. This
lack of targeting resulted in a situation where one-seventh of AfricanAmericans in the United States did not have telephones but multiple
42
lines going into the homes of millionaires were being subsidized.
In 1983, it was estimated that a 100% price increase would result in
only an 8% decline in the total number of households with basic telephone service. 4 3 Thus, the demand for basic telephone service is highly
inelastic. 44 Ideally, Universal Service would only subsidize the 8% who
would otherwise lose their service.
3.

Universal Service ObligationsImposed Only on Local Exchange
CarriersLed to Inefficient Bypass of the Local Telephone System

By allowing competition in telephone service without imposing equal
obligations on telecommunications carriers to contribute to Universal
Service, the FCC created a problem. Since the access charges imposed
by local telephone companies were priced above cost to fund Universal
Service, IXCs had an incentive to bypass the LECs and seek to serve
their customers without paying access charges. Bypass could be
achieved using technologies like cellular service, dedicated microwave
circuits or fiberoptic networks, and low orbiting satellites. 45 Thus, setting the access charges above cost encouraged bypass even in cases
where LECs would actually be the most efficient providers of a service. 4 6
Inefficient bypass results in welfare losses to society. Above-cost access charges may cause a customer to choose a provider who is not the
most efficient service provider. When this happens, bypass customers
and bypass carriers benefit, but society loses. A numerical example demonstrates how this can occur. 4 7 Assume a telephone customer spends
$100,000 annually for long distance service that costs $50,000 to provide.
The non-traffic sensitive cost of this customer allocated to long distance
41. NTIA TELECOM 2000, supra note 8, at 84.
42. FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Speech at the Royal Inst. of Intl Affairs (Sept. 4,
1996), available in 1996 F.C.C. LEXIS 5014.
43. Id.
44. HARRY M. TREBING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY AND TOMORROw 125,
151 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1983).
45. CRANDALL, supra note 34, at 11; Tim Greene, CarrierHopes to Slice the Pie in the
Sky via Global Satellite Net, NETWORK WORLD, Oct. 9, 1995, at 14.

46. Access Charge NPRM, supra note 2, at 42.
47. This example is taken partially from Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Local
Telephone Pricing in a Competitive Environment, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION ToDAY AND TOMORROW 267, 271 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1983).
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is $20,000 annually and the traffic-sensitive portion is $30,000 per year.
Thus, this customer contributes $50,000 annually to the telephone company in excess of the amount it costs the telephone company. The customer would choose to bypass the telephone company if any alternative
method were priced at less than $100,000. However, such an alternative
is efficient only if the annual cost of the alternative is less than $50,000.
If the customer obtains service for $99,000 per year that costs $98,000
per year to provide, the customer would save $1000 per year and the
bypass carrier would earn $1000 per year. However, the local telephone
company would lose $50,000 in revenues. This loss must be borne either
by the owners of the telephone company or by its other customers. The
bypass is inefficient because its benefits only total $2000 per year while
its costs total $50,000. The irony is that even though "competition" has
increased through the bypass carrier's existence, the rates paid by the
telephone company's customers increase.
The bypass incentive has had an enormous impact on the telephone
system. A 1986 study by the General Accounting Office found that up to
30% of large customers were already bypassing the local telephone company to some degree and up to 53% were considering plans to initiate or
increase bypass. 48 In 1984, an FCC model estimated $4 billion per year
and a Bell Communications Research model estimated $10 billion per
year in potential revenue losses to local telephone companies due to
49
bypass.
Prior to the passage of the 1996 Act, at least three potential solutions to the bypass problem had been proposed. These solutions included: (1) relying on competition to lower prices and removing
Universal Service obligations completely; (2) funding the Universal Service programs with general tax revenues; and (3) imposing Universal
Service obligations on all telecommunications carriers thereby eliminating incentives to bypass.
Some commentators argued that complete deregulation would solve
the bypass problem.5 0 This proposal was based on the theory that competition reduces prices for goods and services which makes them more
51
affordable for more consumers and reduces the need for subsidies.
In the example above, assume that the excess $50,000 the customer
was charged was used to fund Universal Service. Under this proposal,
the telephone company could have offered service for $50,000 a year be48.

WALTER G. BOLTER, ET AL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE 1990s AND BE-

YoND 232 (1990).
49. Id.
50. DANIEL L. BRENNER, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMON CARRIERS N THE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 26 (2d ed. 1996).
51. Inquiry on Universal Service and Open Access Issues Part III, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,112
at 1 11 (Sept. 19, 1994).
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cause it would not have needed to collect the excess $50,000 to fund Universal Service. While this proposal is more efficient, it does not
completely address the need for Universal Service. Even in a competitive market, some people would not be able to afford telephones. The
deregulation proposal would not address the negative externalities
caused by people not having telephones and the positive externalities
people experience from having telephones. These include the negative
externality of someone dying because a household does not have 911 access and the positive externalities people get from being able to call family, friends, local businesses, and potential employers. This proposal also
ignores a pure equity argument for Universal Service. It is simply "fair"
that everyone has access to a telephone.
A second proposal for solving the bypass problem was that the government should provide a pure public subsidy to the Universal Service
program using general revenues. 5 2 Under this proposal, the government
would purchase telecommunications services and distribute the services
to those in need. In the example above, everyone's taxes would increase
to cover the $50,000 cost of Universal Service. The telephone company
could offer service for $50,000 a year. This proposal has three advantages. First, funding Universal Service with general revenues would remove the incentive for inefficient bypass because carriers no longer
would have differing Universal Service obligations. Second, some economists argue that this proposal is efficient because it furthers the "benefit
principle" that those who benefit from a service should pay for it. Funding Universal Service with general revenues would spread the costs of
Universal Service to everyone who benefits from Universal Service-society as a whole. Third, the government could make its purchases conditional on certain development or support for underserved areas.5 3 Thus,
this proposal may encourage development by ensuring that development
costs would be recovered.
While this proposal does appear to solve the bypass problem, it has
several drawbacks as well. First, the "benefit principle" can also be invoked to support the third proposal discussed below, that all carriers
should contribute to Universal Service. While society arguably benefits
from Universal Service, those using the network benefit most from Universal Service, so those using the network should probably fund Universal Service.
In addition, imposing taxes on everyone to fund Universal Service
would create additional work for the Internal Revenue Service without
52. Id. at $ 40; HYMAN ET
53. MINISTER

AL.,

supra note 26, at 448.

OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA,

AccEss, AFFORDABIrIY AND

SAL SERVICE ON THE CANADIAN INFORMATION HIGHWAY

info.ic.gc.ca/info-highway/ih.html.>.

UNIVER-

18 (Jan. 1995), available at <httpi/
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changing Universal Service much. Funding Universal Service through
general revenues instead of through charges to carriers would impose
additional costs only on those who currently have no telephone. While
some people choose not to have a telephone, most people who do not have
a telephone are probably too poor to have one. Those too poor to have
telephones probably contribute little to the tax base and have the least
ability to pay for Universal Service. Taxing them to pay for Universal
Service makes no sense.
Further, the potential for encouraging development through government purchase of communications services may not offer a net benefit
because the proposal and bid process often used by the government is
time consuming and imposes additional costs. 5 4 Finally, in the context

of the current political economy, raising taxes to fund new programs
would not be well received. Therefore, this second proposal would offer
some advantages but the proposal discussed below is more politically
feasible.
A third solution proposed for the bypass problem was to impose Universal Service obligations on all carriers. This would remove the incentives for inefficient bypass since no carrier would have an exemption that
it could use to lower its prices. As discussed above, this proposal would
comply with the benefit principle which requires every company that
benefits from the infrastructure of the telephone system to help build
and support that infrastructure. If incumbent LECs no longer had the
exclusive responsibility for Universal Service, they would no longer need
to cross-subsidize. 5 5 In the example above, the telephone company and
the bypass company would each have to contribute a percentage of their
revenues to a centralized Universal Service fund that would finance Universal Service programs. The telephone company would get the customer's business because it is the most efficient service provider. Thus,
this proposal encourages socially beneficial and efficient choices. This
approach was adopted in the 1996 Act.
The disadvantage of requiring all carriers to contribute to Universal
Service is that the system is complex to administer and is also subject to
disputes over who should pay and who should be subsidized and by how
much.5 6 ISPs are currently at the center of such a dispute regarding
7
whether they must contribute to Universal Service. 5
54. Id.
55. William G. Shepherd, Concepts of Competition and Efficient Policy in the Telecom-

munications Sector, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS

REGULATION TODAY AND TOMORRoW

(Eli M. Noam ed., 1983).
56. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA, supra note 53, at 18.
57. See Section IV(B)(2) infra.

79, 95
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UNIVERSAL SERVICE UNDER THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF

1996
1. Overview of The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 makes sweeping changes in
United States telecommunications law. 58 The 1996 Act opens all telecommunications markets to competition. This includes opening the local
telephone market which has been held by regional monopolies since the
Bell System was forced to divest its local companies in the Modified Final
Judgment in 1982. In addition, to further encourage infrastructure
growth, the 1996 Act requires all carriers to connect with other
carriers. 59

For the benefit of incumbent local monopolies, the 1996 Act eliminates the business restrictions and cross-ownership restrictions under
which they had been operating. LECs are now free to enter the cable
television market. LECs can also enter the long distance telephone market if they comply with certain requirements. 60
In addition, the 1996 Act gives potential competitors new rights to
help them compete with incumbent LECs. The 1996 Act confers three
fundamental rights on potential competitors: the right to interconnect
with local telephone companies at rates based on cost, including a reasonable profit;6 1 the right to obtain access to unbundled pieces of the local network at cost-based rates; 62 and the right to obtain an incumbent
LEC's retail services at wholesale discounts and the right to resell those
63
services.
In addition to opening the local telephone market to competition, the
drafters of the 1996 Act also attempted to solve some of the problems
with Universal Service. The 1996 Act requires that all providers of telecommunications service contribute to Universal Service and that the
mechanism used to collect and distribute the Universal Service funds be
specific, predictable, and sufficient to preserve and advance Universal
64
Service.
Congress directed the FCC to base its policies for the preservation
and advancement of Universal Service on the following principles:6 5
58. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47

U.S.C.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

§ 151 (1996)).
47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1996).
47 U.S.C. § 271 (1996).
47 U.S.C. §§ 251(cX2), 252(d)(1) (1996).
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (1996).
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (1996).
47 U.S.C. §§ 254 (b)(4),(5) (1996).
47 U.S.C. § 254 (b) (1996).
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(1) QUALITY AND RATEs.-Quality services should be available at just,
reasonable, and affordable rates.
(2) ACCESS TO ADVANCED SERVICES.-Access to advanced telecommunications and information services should be provided in all regions of the
Nation.

(3) ACCESS IN RURAL AND HIGH COST AREAs.-Consumers in all regions of
the Nation, including low-income consumers and those in rural, insular,
and high cost areas, should have access to telecommunications and information services, including interexchange services and advanced telecommunications and information services, that are reasonably
comparable to those services provided in urban areas and that are
available at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for
similar services in urban areas.
(4) EQUITABLE AND NONDISCRIMINATORY CONTRIBUTIONS.-All providers

of telecommunications services should make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and advancement of universal service.
(5) SPECIFIC AND PREDICTABLE SUPPORT MECHANISMs.-There should be
specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State mechanisms to
preserve and advance universal service.
(6) ACCESS TO ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES FOR SCHOOLS,
HEALTH CARE, AND LIBRARIES.-Elementary and secondary schools and
classrooms, health care providers, and libraries should have access to
advanced telecommunications services as described in subsection (h).

(7) ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES.-Such other principles as the Joint Board
and the Commission determine are necessary and appropriate for the
protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity and are
consistent with this Act.
As well as including these general principles regarding Universal
Service in the 1996 Act, Congress also specified procedures for determining the new Universal Service policies. The 1996 Act authorizes the FCC
to institute and refer to a Federal-State Joint Board a proceeding to recommend changes that make FCC regulations consistent with the 1996
66
Act.
In addition to its authorization to create the Joint Board on Universal Service, the FCC was authorized to institute proceedings to implement the local competition and access charge reform required by the
1996 Act. The FCC instituted such proceedings. The Local Competition
Order was completed August 8, 1996.67 The Joint Board on Universal
66. 47 U.S.C. § 254(aXl) (1996).
67. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996), Order
on Reconsideration, CC Docket No, 96-98, 11 F.C.C.R. 13,042 (1996), petition for review
pending and partial stay granted, sub nom. Iowa Utilities Board et. al v. FCC, No. 96-3321
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Service released its recommendations November 8, 1996.68 Finally, the
FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Access Charge Reform
for which the comment period closed February 13, 1997.69 In terms of
Universal Service reform, both the recommendations of the Joint Board
on Universal Service and the results of the Access Charge Reform proceeding are important because access charges and Universal Service
have been closely related in the past.
The Joint Board on Universal Service consisted of eight people,
three from the FCC, four state utility commissioners, and a designated
consumer representative. 70 The Joint Board was to advise the FCC on
implementing changes to its Universal Service program. The FCC
wanted its Universal Service program to,
[ble as simple to administer as possible, technology-neutral, and
designed to identify the minimum subsidy required to achieve the statutory goal of affordable and reasonably comparable rates throughout the
country. It should be equitable and non-discriminatory in the burden
that it imposes upon contributors, and
its distribution procedures
71
should be direct, explicit, and specific.
After reviewing the recommendations of the Joint Board, the FCC
issued its new Universal Service order and rules on May 8, 1997.72
In the Access Charge Reform proceeding, the FCC undertook a comprehensive review of its access charge regime to ensure that it complies
with the 1996 Act. 73 The FCC's goal was to move towards significantly

more cost-based access charges. 74 The FCC released a First Report and
7
Order on the Access Charge Reform on May 16, 1997. 5

Both the Joint Board on Universal Service and the FCC, in its Access Charge Reform proceedings, have attempted to solve some of the
problems with Universal Service discussed in Section If(C) above.
2. Solution to Implicit, Internal Subsidies
Prior to the 1996 Act, Universal Service was funded by a combination of access charges and rate averaging systems. For instance, about
and consolidated cases (8th Cir., Oct. 15, 1996), partial stay lifted in part, Iowa Utilities
Board et. al v. FCC, No. 96-3321 and consolidated cases (8th Cir. Nov. 1, 1996).
68. Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36.
69. Access Charge NPRM, supra note 2.
70. Steve Lohr, A Nation Ponders Its Growing DigitalDivide: Weighing Costs of Information-Age Access for Every School and Library, N.Y. Tdms, Oct. 21, 1996, at C5.
71. Universal Service NPRM, supra note 5, at 10,504.
72. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 13,708 (1996)
(Report and Order) [hereinafter Universal Service Report and Order].
73. Access Charge NPRM, supra note 2, at 9 5.
74. Id. at 112.
75. In re Access Charge Reform, 1997 FCC LEXIS 2591 (released May 16, 1997) (First
Report and Order) [hereinafter Access Charge First Report and Order].
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25% of the cost of a local telephone company's connection to a customer
was allocated to the interstate jurisdiction but only about 15% of the loop
usage was interstate traffic. 76 These implicit subsidies created unclear
signals regarding costs and reduced competition. 77 In the Congressional
Committee Report on Section 254 of the 1996 Act, the section concerning
Universal Service, the committee stated, "Conferees intend that any support mechanisms continued or created under new section 254 should be
explicit, rather than implicit as many support mechanisms are today."78
In addition, the 1996 Act states, "There should be specific, predictable
and sufficient Federal and State mechanisms to preserve and advance
79
universal service."
The Joint Board on Universal Service proposed solving the problem
of implicit subsidies by reducing access charges to cost and creating a
new Universal Service mechanism with explicit subsidies. The Joint
Board proposed that this new Universal Service mechanism would be
funded by all interstate telecommunications carriers. These carriers
would contribute to a fund based on a percentage of their telecommunications revenue less the amounts paid to other carriers.8 0
To demonstrate how these proposals will change the access charge
system, five of the current access charges are analyzed below. The status
of each access charge prior to the 1996 Act is described. Then the Joint
Board proposals and the FCC decisions on how it should be administered
to be consistent with the 1996 Act are summarized. Like these five access charges, other access charges will be changed in similar ways.
a.

Subscriber Line Charge ("SLC") and Common CarrierLine Charge
("CCL")

Both the SLC and the CCL have been used by LECs to recover the
interstate portion of local loop costs, the costs of connecting a customer to
an LEC's central office. Prior to the 1996 Act, LECs recovered these
costs through flat subscriber line charges to customers. 8 1 However, the
SLC was capped at $3.50 per month for residential lines.8 2 If an LEC
did not recover the entire loop cost from the SLC, it recovered the remaining portion through a per-minute carrier common line charge paid
by IXCs.8 3 Charging the CCL on a per minute basis did not correlate
with the fixed costs of maintaining the local loop. The result was that
76. Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at n.2405.
77. See Section II(C)(1) supra.

78. Conference Report on Telecom Act of 1996 § 254, Feb. 1, 1996 (emphasis added).
79. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5) (1996) (emphasis added).
80. Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at $ 778.
81. Universal Service NPRM, supra note 5, at 10,516.

82. Id.
83. Id.
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high volume long distance customers contributed more than the costs of
84
their lines.
The Joint Board did not decide whether this use-sensitive CCL was
a support flow for Universal Service. 8 5 However, it did conclude that the
current CCL is an inefficient method of cost recovery and recommended
that LECs not be required to recover non-traffic sensitive costs on a traffic sensitive basis.8 6 The FCC adopted an alternative approach based on
a proposal by the Joint Board that LECs are to recover a flat charge on
each line from a customer's presubscribed long distance carrier.8 7 However, while the Joint Board had proposed that any balance be through
the new Universal Service support mechanism, 88 the FCC decided to allow LECs to continue charging IXCs on a traffic sensitive basis for two to
89
three years.
b.

Long Term Support ( LTS") Payments

LTS supports carriers with higher than average subscriber line costs
(often rural carriers). LTS payments allow all LECs to charge a nationwide average CCL interstate access rate. Prior to the 1996 Act, LTS was
funded by contributions from LECs with lower than average subscriber
line costs. 90

The Joint Board concluded that LTS payments constitute a Universal Service support mechanism that serves to equalize LECs' access
charges by raising some carriers' charges and lowering others' charges. 9 1
The Joint Board recommended that LTS no longer be supported via the
access charge regime but that high cost LECs continue to receive payments comparable to LTS from the new Universal Service support mechanism. 92 The FCC adopted the Joint Board's recommendations. 93
c. Link Up America
Link Up America provides support for low income consumers by paying for a portion of telephone installation charges. Prior to the 1996 Act,
it was funded by shifting local costs to IXCs. 94 The Joint Board recom-

mended that the cost-shifting cease and that Link Up America be funded
84. Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at 774.
Id. at 754.
Access Charge First Report and Order, supra note 75, at 9 72.
Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at 776.
Access Charge First Report and Order, supra note 75, at 1 71.
Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at 190.
Id. at 9 767.
Id. at 9 768.
Universal Service Report and Order, supra note 72, at 1 751.
Universal Service NPRM, supra note 5, at 10,509.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996

1997]

through contributions from all interstate telecommunications carriers to
the new Universal Service mechanism.9 5 The FCC adopted the Joint
96
Board's recommendation.
d. Lifeline
Lifeline provides support for low income consumers by waiving part
or all of the Subscriber Line Charge. Prior to the 1996 Act, Lifeline was
97
funded by shifting the SLC to IXCs.

Even though the 1996 Act states that "nothing in this section shall
affect the collection, distribution, or administration of the Lifeline Assistance program," 98 the Joint Board recommended that the Lifeline support
be delinked from the SLC and funded through the new Universal Service
mechanism so that all carriers, not just long distance carriers, would
contribute to supporting this program. 99 The FCC adopted this proposal
by the Joint Board.' 0 0 Now, all carriers that provide interstate telecommunications services will contribute to Lifeline on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis.
3. Solution to Subsidies Not Being Narrowly Tailored
Prior to the 1996 Act, people who did not need subsidies were receiving subsidies. For example, a millionaire with multiple lines running
into his house received Universal Service subsidies on each residential
line. °10 To solve this problem, the Joint Board recommended that Universal Service support should not be provided for multi-line business or
10 2
residential connections beyond the primary residential connection.
Under this recommendation, the initial primary residence line would be
the only type of line fully supported and service to single-connection
businesses would be supported at a reduced rate. 10 3 In its recent Access
ChargeFirstReport and Order, the FCC decided to raise the Subscriber
Line Charges on multi-line businesses from $6.00 per month to $9.00 per
month in the first year and to phase in increases for non-primary residential connections. 10 4 However, households and single line businesses
that could afford to pay the full cost of a primary line will still be subsi95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at 91 8, 423, 426.
Universal Service Report and Order, supra note 72, at 91379.
Universal Service NPRM, supra note 5, at 10,509.
47 U.S.C. § 254(j) (1997).
Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at 9 8, 423, 426.
Universal Service Report and Order, supra note 72, at 91364.
See Section II(CX2) supra.
Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at 91 89-92.
Id. at 9 4, 89.
Access Charge First Report and Order, supra note 75, at 9 39.
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dized. Thus, the narrow tailoring problem will still only be partially
resolved.
4. Solution to Bypass
As explained in Section II(C)(3) above, prior to the 1996 Act, imposing access charges that were above cost caused substantial bypass of
LECs even though LECs may have been the most efficient providers of
local service. To solve this problem, the 1996 Act requires that "All providers of telecommunications services should make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and advancement of
universal service." 10 5 It also states that "[e]very telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to the specific,
predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by the Commission to
preserve and advance universal service." 10 6 Carriers can be exempted
from this requirement "only ... in cases where the administrative cost of
collecting contributions from a carrier or carriers would exceed the contribution that carrier would otherwise have to make under the formula
07
for contributions selected by the Commission."
The Joint Board recommended that all carriers that provide interstate telecommunications services make contributions to the support
mechanism based on their gross interstate and intrastate telecommuni08
cations revenues less payments to other telecommunications carriers. 1
The FCC adopted a modified proposal which would assess contributions
based on interstate and intrastate revenues from end-user telecommunications for Universal Service programs related to schools, libraries, and
health care providers.' 0 9 For Universal Service programs covering high
cost and low income consumers, the contributions would only be based on
interstate end-user telecommunications revenues." 0
The Joint Board also recommended that the requirement that all
carriers that provide interstate telecommunications service be construed
broadly: "We recommend requiring any entity that provides any interstate telecommunications for a fee to the public, or to such classes of eligible users as to be effectively available to a substantial portion of the
public, to contribute to the fund.""' To define which carriers are included in "every telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications," the Joint Board recommended that the FCC adopt a
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

47 U.S.C. § 254(bX4) (1997) (emphasis added).
47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (1997) (emphasis added).
S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1996).
Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at T 778.
Universal Service Report and Order, supra note 72, at T 772.
Id.
Id. at T 784.
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similar definition of "interstate telecommu nications" as that used for determining Telecommunications Relay Service (IRS") support which includes "cellular telephone and paging, mobile radio, operator services,
PCS, access (including SLC), alternative access and special access,
packet switched, WATS, 800, 900, MTS, private line, telex, telegraph,
video, satellite, international, interLATA and resale services." 1 12 The
FCC adopted these proposals with minor changes."13 The only change
relevant to this article is that the FCC removed "packet switched" from
the list of interstate telecommunications stating, "We agree with the
Joint Board that "packet switched" services can qualify as interstate
telecommunications, but we remove "packet switched" from our list because that term describes how information is transmitted rather than
1 14
defining a particular service that would be ordered by a customer."
Thus, the FCC did not foreclose the possibility that packet-switched
services, which will be explained below, might be subject to Universal
Service obligations. This broad interpretation of interstate telecommunications should help solve the bypass problem described above because
if all carriers must contribute the same percentage of their revenues,
there is no incentive to engage in inefficient bypass.
One of the ongoing issues in Universal Service and Access Charge
Reform is whether Internet service providers should be included as carriers required to contribute to Universal Service and pay access charges.
This issue is discussed below. First, some background information on
the Internet and Internet service providers gives context to the current
issues.
III. THE INTERNET
A.

THE INTERNET AND

How IT WORKS

The Internet is a network of networks. 1 15 It allows people to communicate with each other through various interconnected communications networks. 1 6 These networks use twisted pair copper wire, coax
cable, fiber optic cable, satellites, and wireless technologies to transmit
information from one computer to another at speeds of billions of bits per
second. 11 7 The networks are provided by LECs, IXCs, cable television
providers, television and radio broadcasters, cellular carriers, competitive access providers, paging system providers, and satellite provid112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 9 780, 785.
Universal Service Report and Order, supra note 72, at $ 780.
Id.
BRENDAN P. KEHOE, ZEN AND THE ART OF THE INTERNET 4 (1993).
Andreotta, supra note 18, at 222.
Id.
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ers.11 8 The Internet allows users to communicate quickly and easily.
The average person uses the Internet to communicate with others,
conduct research, shop, and read the news. Individual users usually connect to the Internet through universities, employers, or private Internet
service providers like America Online, Netcom, Prodigy, or CompuServe.
An individual's computer is connected to a host computer either by dialing the host computer and connecting with it using a modem or by being
hard-wired to the host.
To access a dial-up connection, a user needs only a telephone line, a
modem, and a computer. 1 1 9 Dial up access is now available for $15 to
$100 per month. 120 To use dial-up access, the user calls a local number
that connects the user's computer to a host computer. 12 1 Information
then flows back and forth between the two computers. Every host on the
Internet has a numeric address, called its Internet number or IP Address. 1 22 The host is connected to a regional network, which connects to
an Internet backbone. At each stage, the computers know where to send
the information by using routing information attached to the user's data.
The Internet uses a technology called packet-switching to transport
data. Before a user's data are sent over the Internet, they are broken
into small chunks called "packets."123 Packets can contain data, digital
voice, digitized images or video. 12 4 Each packet contains a header with
its routing information. 125 Computers along the Internet examine the
headers and move each packet along to the next site closer to its destina12 7
tion. 126 If one link fails, the computer selects an alternate route.
When one computer is not sending packets, the line is available for packets from other computers. 128 Packet-switching is an extremely efficient
use of network resources because packets from different users can be
1 29
mixed together and sorted at separate destinations.
118. Id. at 223.
119. Carol C. Henderson & Frederick D. King, The Role of Public Libraries in Providing
PublicAccess to the Internet, in PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE INTERNET 161 (Brian Kahin & James
Keller eds., 1995).
120. Id.
121. PAUL GILSTER, T1m NEW INTERNET NAVIGATOR 33 (1995).
122. KEHOE, supra note 115, at 3.
123. Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason & Hal R. Varian, Pricing The Internet, in PUBLIC ACCESS
TO THE INTERNET 270 (Brian Kahin & James Keller eds., 1995).
124. JOHN C. MORLEY & STAN S. GELBER, THE EMERGING DIGITAL FuTuRE: AN OVERVIEW OF BROADBAND AND MULTIMEDIA NETWORKS 71 (1996).

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
ACCESS

GMSTER, supra note 121, at 23.
Id.

Id.
Mackie-Mason & Varian, supra note 123, at 270.
Brian Kahin, The Internet And The National InformationInfrastructure,in PUBLIc
TO THE INTERNET 12 (Brian Kahin & James Keller eds., 1995).
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A "packet-switched" network differs from the network used for telephone calls, the "circuit-switched" network. When a telephone user dials
a number using the circuit-switched network, a dedicated path is set up
between the caller and the number called. That path is held open until
the call is terminated.13 0 When using a packet-switched network, no
end-to-end circuit needs to be established. 13 1 Packets travel independently and may travel over different paths in a network to reach a com132
mon destination.
Many different types of computers can communicate over the In33
ternet because the Internet uses a standard protocol called TCP/IP.1
This protocol is a set of conventions that determines how data are exchanged between different programs.' 3 4 Transmission Control Protocol
("TCP") breaks up the messages into packets and specifies how to reassemble them.135 Internet Protocol ("IP") provides the necessary information for computers acting as routers to move each packet to the next link
13 6
towards its final destination.
No single entity owns the Internet. The Internet is an overlay network that depends on the telephone infrastructure for transport and
routing. 13 7 So, most lines connecting computers on the Internet are
owned by telephone companies. The Internet could be considered a "virtual" private network because it uses facilities owned by telephone companies but is a private digital network. 138 However, the Internet differs
from other private digital networks that might be owned by companies
to transmit their own data, because it was built partially by the federal
39
government and is managed in a highly decentralized fashion.1
B.
1.

THE HISTORY OF THE INTERNET

From Remote Computing to Communications Tool

The first ideas for the Internet and packet-switching were developed
around 1961.140 The Internet grew out of a network created for the Ad130.
131.
132.
133.

Mackie-Mason & Varian, supra note 123, at 270.
MORLEY & GELBER, supra note 124, at 71.
Id.

KEHOE, supra note 115, at 4.
134. GEI.STER, supra note 121, at 21.

135. Mackie-Mason & Varian, supra note 123, at 270.
136. Id.
137. ANDERSON ET AL, supra note 9, at 80.

138. Paul E. Peters, Product and Service Development Strategies in the Rapidly Developing Marketplace for Internet Information, in THREE VIEws OF THE INTERNET 21, 23 (Ann

Marie Cunningham & Wendy Wicks eds. 1993).
139. Id.
140. Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet (last modified Feb. 20, 1997)
<httpJ/www.isoc.org>.
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vanced Research Projects Agency ("ARPA") of the U.S. Department of
Defense called ARPAnet. 14 1 ARPAnet connected university, military,
and defense contractors so that researchers could share information and
could study computer-based command and control for the U.S. military. 142 By the end of 1969, four universities were connected to
43
ARPAnet.1
At first, users could only log on and run programs on remote computers.14 4 There was no concept of user-to-user communications in this
stage. 145 In 1973, ARPA, under the new acronym, DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), began a project called the Internetting Project.146 The goal was to examine packet switching by radio and
satellite in two networks linked to ARPAnet; and to develop gateways
that would allow information to pass seamlessly between them.14 7 The
designers of ARPAnet soon added file transfer, electronic mail and mailing list capabilities. 148 With these additions, users could communicate
49
with each other over the network.1
2. The Network Expands
In 1983, the U.S. Defense Communications Agency mandated the
use of the TCP/IP protocol for all ARPAnet hosts. 15 0 This established a
standard which helped the Internet grow.
In the 1980s, ARPAnet expanded by allowing interconnection by
groups like CSNET, a network linking computer science departments in
several states.' 5 ' In addition, the National Science Foundation ("NSF")
developed NSFnet which connected university campuses to six
supercomputing centers. 152 By 1986, NSF had expanded its efforts into
a backbone network.' 5 3 NSF also helped fund regional networks in141. C. BRYAN GABBARD & GEORGE S. PARK, THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB
WORLD: COMMERCIAL, CULTURE AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS-MIDDLE EAST MEETS THE INTERNET 11 (1995).
142. GILSTER, supra note 121, at 21.
143. Leiner, supra note 140.
144. GHSTER, supra note 121, at 21.
145. Terrence P. McGarty & Carole Haywood, Internet ArchitecturalAnd Policy Implications For Migration From High-End User To The New User, in PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE
INTERNET 234, 236 (Brian Kahin & James Keller eds., 1995).
146. GnSTER, supra note 121, at 21.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. McGarty, supra note 145, at 237.
150. GILSTER, supra note 121, at 23.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 24.
153. Id.
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tended to connect universities to NSFnet.' 5 4 The original NSFnet backbone connected six sites by 56-kbps data circuits. This backbone was
quickly overloaded. 155 From 1982 to 1986, the backbone was upgraded to
the T1 rate (1.544 Mbps). 156 In 1987, NSF awarded a contract to Merit,
Inc. (Michigan Education and Research Infrastructure Triad) in partnership with MCI and IBM to manage
and operate the NSFnet backbone
15 7
and continue its development.
58
By July 1988, NSFnet had 13 nodes connected to its backbone.'
Between July 1988 and July 1989, the network averaged 20% growth per
month.' 5 9 During this period, many local and regional networks were
1 60
attached to the network.
At the close of the 1980s, the networks of the Internet were still noncommercial and if not directly subsidized, were indirectly subsidized by
their free use of the cross-country NSFnet backbone. 1 1 NSFnet's Acceptable Use Policy, which governed the use of its network, excluded "ex16 2
tensive use for private or personal business."
3. Commercial Use Begins and Government Involvement Declines
In the early 1990s, commercial use of the Internet began, and the
government began to withdraw funding for the Internet. Commercial Internet access was first offered by PSI and AlterNet beginning in early
1990.163 In September 1990, NSF announced formation of Advanced

Network & Services, Inc. ("ANS"). 16 4 ANS was created by Merit, IBM,
and MCI and operated under contract to Merit. 165 This contract required ANS to operate the T1 backbone and to build a new T3 backbone
(45 Mbps) to supersede it. 166

The T3 backbone was completed in

1992.167 This upgrade represented a 700-fold increase in power.' 6 8 T3
lines carry data at the equivalent of 1,400 pages single-spaced text per
154. Id.
155. Id.

156. McGarty, supra note 145, at 237.
157. GILSTER, supra note 121, at 24.
158. Id.

159. Id.
160.
161.
162.
163.

McGarty, supra note 145, at 237.
Kahin, supra note 129, at 6.
GISTER, supra note 121, at 41.
Kahin, supra note 129, at 6.
164. GnSTER, supra note 121, at 24.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Smoot Carl-Mitchell & John S. Quarterman, The Recent History of the Internet
and the Matrix (visited Mar. 28, 1997) <gopher://akasha.tic.com:70/00/tic/
history.recent>. GMSTER, supra note 121, at 24.
168. GnsTE, supra note 121, at 24.
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second.16 9 With the T3 backbone functioning, a new arrangement developed that allowed ANS to operate two separate networks over the same
equipment: NSFnet would continue to support institutions reliant on
government subsidies for connections and ANS CO+RE, a subsidiary,
which would support commercial users of the Internet.170 ANS was acquired by America Online in 1994.171
By 1994, commercial use of the Internet had grown to such an extent
that the number of commercial Internet hosts exceeded the number of
educational hosts. 1 72 Commercial Internet service providers like Prodigy, CompuServe, America Online, and GEnie began to link their users
173
to the Internet.
In April 1995, the funding for the NSFnet backbone was removed by
NSF. 1 74 The ARPAnet had also been decommissioned in 1990.175 To-

day, a few of the networks that make up the Internet are still subsidized
by the government, but most are not.176 Nevertheless, the assumption
17 7
that the Internet is government-subsidized lingers.
In 1996, the network moved to a gigabit-per-second backbone, allowing real-time access to multimedia processing, video, and supercomputer networking. 178 End users' computers may now have sufficient
processing power and memory to be hosts. 179 One of the newest features
on the Internet is the World Wide Web. It allows users to click on
hypermedia links to see data no matter where the data are located.
Many new users are connecting to the Internet to use the World Wide
Web. 18 0 One of the other new trends on the Internet is real-time applications like Internet telephony products which are discussed in detail in
Section IV(B)(2) below.
4. The Internet Today
Today the backbone of the Internet is run by internetMCI, a commercial service provider operating with SprintLink and ANSNET.' 8 ' It
can be operated over telephone lines, cable television lines, satellite
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 25.
172. GABBARD & PARK, supra note 141, at 13.
173. Kenneth D. Suzan, Tapping to the Beat of a Digital Drummer: Fine Tuning U.S.
Copyright Law for Music Distributionon the Internet, 59 Ai. L. REV. 789, 793 (1995).

174. Leiner, supra note 140.
175. GL.STER, supra note 121, at 23.

176. Kahin, supra note 129, at 6.
177. Id.

178.
179.
180.
181.

McGarty, supra note 145, at 237.
Id. at 238.
GMSTER, supra note 121, at 20.
Id. at 24, 25.
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links, fiber-optic lines, or wireless communications systems. The midlevel networks are run by various entities: some are operated by states,
some are run by consortia, some are run commercially, and some are
managed by university computer scientists. 18 2 NSF has encouraged regional networks to connect to new sites and wean themselves of NSF
support. 183 Each network is responsible for its own funding and its own
administrative procedures. 184
It is difficult to estimate the size of the Internet but estimates in
January 1997 range from about 4 million to 16 million host computers
connected.185 These estimates are up from the estimates of one year earlier of 1.6 million to 9.4 million hosts.' 8 6 In 1995, there were an estimated 22 to 30 million users and that number has surely risen since
then.' 8 7 However, extensive Internet use is by no means nationwide.
Fifty percent of U.S. Internet hosts are located in just five states: California, Massachusetts, New York, Texas, and Virginia, and within those
states the hosts are densely concentrated in a small number of metropolitan regions.' 8 8
Even though the federal government has removed most of its financial support for the Internet as the Internet has commercialized, President Clinton's Administration strongly supports Internet development.
The Clinton Administration believes that all segments of U.S. society
and sectors of the economy will depend upon access to reliable, affordable, and ubiquitous networks and networked information in the twentyfirst century, just as society and the economy in the twentieth century
depended upon access to reliable, affordable, and ubiquitous highways
and transportation resources and services.' 8 9

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Network Wizards, Internet Domain Survey (visited Feb. 10,

1997) <http'l/

www.nw.com>.

186. Network Wizards, Internet Growth Summary (visited Mar. 28, 1997) <http'/
www.mit.edu/people/mkgray/net/internet-growth-summary.html>.
187. See GLSTER, supra note 121, at 19.
188. Mitchell L. Moss & Anthony Townsend, Leaders and Losers on the Internet (last
modified Sept. 11, 1996) < http'//www.nyu.edu/urban/research/internet/internet.html>.
189. Peters, supra note 138, at 24. The Clinton Administration also supports moving
toward including support for universal access to the Internet in Universal Service programs. The 1996 Act contains provisions that start the movement in that direction. Universal access to the Internet is beyond the scope of this paper, but there have been several
proposals and analyses of this issue. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 9; Public Access to
the Internet (Brian Kahin & James Keller eds., 1995).
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INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS USE THE PUBLIC SWITCHED
TELEPHONE NETWORK

An Internet service provider is an entity whose function is to allow
dial-in users to access the Internet. ISPs vary in many dimensions including their target market served, their area of coverage, and their organizational form (for-profit versus non-profit). 190 ISP costs vary with
these dimensions. 19 1 ISP entry costs are low-the hardware needed
costs less than $15,000.192
To serve its customers, an ISP sets up a center which has modems,
routers, World Wide Web servers, authentication servers, and mail servers. 19 3 From this dial-up center, customers' traffic is routed to the In194
ternet backbone over dedicated facilities or to other on-line services.
ISPs like CompuServe and America Online usually lease long distance
95
transmission facilities from common carriers such as AT&T and MCI. 1
To lessen the expense of access for their customers, ISPs try to locate
their dial-up centers so that subscribers can dial in by placing a local
call. 19 6 An ISP's local communications costs are low because ISPs are
considered regular business customers by current telecommunications
regulations. 19 7 Thus, ISPs can lease a flat-rate business line that has no
per-minute, usage-based charge for receiving calls from its customers. 19 8
For example, the price for a local business line in Virginia is $16.93 to
$18.93 per month per line (including the subscriber line charge). 19 9 That
price is all that an ISP would have to pay for a line because an ISPs
traffic is all incoming, and current FCC regulations contain no charges
for incoming calls, otherwise known as terminating access. 20 0 However,
the FCC is now seeking comments on whether it should require parties
receiving calls to pay for terminating access, so this may change. 2 0 1
190. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 96.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 98.
193. Report of Bell Atlantic on Internet Traffic, (visited Mar. 28, 1997) <http'/
www.ba.com/ea/fcc/report.htm> [hereinafter Bell Atlantic Report].
194. Id.
195. MORLEY & GELBER, supra note 124, at 89.
196. Bell Atlantic Report, supra note 193.
197. Id.
198. In re Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced
Service Providers, 2 F.C.C.R. 4305 (released July 17, 1987) (Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking).
199. Bell Atlantic Report, supra note 193.
200. Access Charge NPRM, supra note 2, at n.380.
201. Id. at 9 275.
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IV.

INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS' OBLIGATIONS TO PAY
ACCESS CHARGES AND CONTRIBUTE TO UNIVERSAL
SERVICE
A.

ISPs' CuRRENT EXEMPTION FROM ACCESS CHARGES

As explained above, Universal Service has been partially funded
through access charges since 1983. However, ISPs have been exempt
from paying access charges, so they also have been exempt from contributing to Universal Service.
ISPs are considered enhanced service providers ("ESPs") by the
FCC. The FCC first distinguished "enhanced services" from "basic services" in its Computer II hearings. 20 2 In these hearings, the FCC attempted to determine which computer and telecommunications services
to regulate. 20 3 The FCC had found its earlier distinction between "data
processing" and "telecommunications" unworkable and wanted a new
regulatory distinction. 20 4 In Computer II, the FCC defined "basic" services as transmission and switching only. Everything else was "en5
hanced" services. 20
In 1983, when the FCC adopted its access charge plan, it temporarily exempted ESPs from having to pay access charges because it was concerned about rate shock. The FCC thought the shock on the ESPs might
be too great if they suddenly had to go from paying only for a regular
business line to paying full access charges. 20 6 At that time, the FCC said
that the exemption was only temporary and that it wanted to develop a
rate structure under which all exchange access users were charged on
the same basis. 20 7 Nevertheless, the ESP exemption has continued since
then.
In 1987, the FCC tentatively concluded that the exemption from access charges for ESPs should be removed and that they should be subject
to access charges for using local exchange facilities. 20 8 The FCC was
concerned that ESPs were not paying enough to cover the costs of exchange access facilities they use.20 9 The FCC decided that the ESPs had
been warned that they would be subject to access charges, so the rate
202. See In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (released May 2, 1980) (Final Decision) [hereafter Computer II].
203. Id. at 1.
204. Id. at 394.
205. Id. at 420.
206. See In re MTS and WATS Market Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d 682 (1983) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order).
207. Id. at 77.
208. In re Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced
Service Providers, supra note 198.
209. Id.
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shock rationale no longer applied. However, the FCC decided not to remove the ESP access charge exemption at that time because the ESP
industry was entering a "unique period of rapid and substantial
change. 21o
The exemption was reviewed again in 1989.211 Not surprisingly,
ESPs supported retention of their exemption. 2 12 LECs argued that the
exemption should be phased out because it unfairly gives ESPs special
preference and forces other users to absorb the costs not covered by
ESPs. 2 13 The FCC noted that the ESP industry had an important need

for stability in a transitional phase of its development. 2 14 However, the
FCC also noted that the exemption places some burden on ordinary interstate ratepayers because ESP customers do not contribute to the interstate share of local exchange costs to the same extent that customers
of other interstate services do. 215 The FCC balanced its desire to foster
development of the enhanced services industry with its concern that special treatment of ESPs not unduly burden other interstate ratepayers. 2 16
After balancing, the FCC concluded that the ESP exemption should be
retained. 2 17
B.

ISPs UNDER THE 1996 ACT

The 1996 Act does not address who must contribute to Universal
Service except by saying that "[a]ll providers of telecommunications
services should make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to
the preservation and advancement of universal service" 2 18 and that
"[e]very telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to the specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms
210. In re Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced
Service Providers, 3 F.C.C.R. 2631 (released Apr. 27, 1988) (Order).
211. In re Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to the Creation of
Access Charge Supplements for Open Network Architecture, 4 F.C.C.R. 3983 (released
May 9, 1989) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
212. In re Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to the Creation of
Access Charge Supplements for Open Network Architecture Policy and Rules Concerning
Rates for Dominant Carriers, 6 F.C.C.R 4524,
56 (released July 11, 1991) (Report and
Order & Order on Further Reconsideration & Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking).
213. Id. at $ 57.

214. In re Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to the Creation of
Access Charge Supplements for Open Network Architecture, supra note 211, at 3987.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See In re Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced
Service Providers, supra note 210, at $ 60.
218. 47 U.S.C. § 254(bX4) (1997) (emphasis added).
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established by the Commission to preserve and advance universal
2 19
service."
In the Joint Board proceeding on Universal Service and the FCC
proceeding on access charge reform, the issue of whether ISPs should be
subject to access charges and Universal Service obligations has been discussed. In its recent Universal Service Order, the FCC concluded that
information service providers and enhanced service providers are not required to contribute to Universal Service support mechanisms to the extent they provide information and enhanced services. 220 Unfortunately,
this does not completely resolve the issue. The FCC has asked the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council, an advisory committee of
industry representatives organized to advise the FCC, to analyze the effects of Internet usage on the public switched telephone network. 22 1 In
addition, the FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry on Implications of Information Service and Internet Usage seeking comments on the costs ISPs imservices provided by
pose on the telephone network and on whether some222
ISPs should produce Universal Service obligations.
The ISPs' current exemption from paying access charges means that
ISPs are exempt both from paying access charges that other telecommunications providers must pay and from contributing to Universal Service.
Although this article primarily deals with Universal Service, a brief contextual discussion of access charges is warranted here.
1. Applying Access Charges to ISPs
As discussed in Section II(D) above, the Joint Board on Universal
Service recommended and the FCC is moving toward discontinuing support of Universal Service through access charges and reducing access
charges so they only represent the cost of local access. Thus, the issue of
whether access charges are applied to ISPs will have more bearing now
on cost recovery than on Universal Service.
No one has argued that ISPs should not pay for the costs they impose on the network. The current disagreement is over whether the ISPs
do pay for their costs.
Some argue that ISPs are not paying for the costs they impose on
network. They argue that since ISPs do not charge their customers on a
time-sensitive basis, they are not covering their costs. For example, Pacific Telesis offered 20 hours of Internet access per month for $14.95,
with each additional hour priced at 50 cents, up to a maximum charge of
219. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (1997) (emphasis added).
220. Universal Service Report and Order, supra note 72, at 788.
221. Access Charge NPRM, supra note 2, at 1 287.
222. Id. at sec. X. Comment Date Mar. 24, 1997, Reply Comment Date Apr. 23, 1997.
Comments can be found at <http'/www.fcc.gov/isp.html>.
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$19.95 per month. A Pacific Telesis spokesman stated, "Even if you
never hang up the phone it's still just $19.95."223 Those arguing that

ISPs do not cover their costs say this flat rate encourages overuse and
inefficient use of resources.
LECs have conducted studies which show that most users do spend
a great deal of time on-line. For instance, a Bell Atlantic study found
that in one month, the average length of calls to ISPs was eighteen minutes, while other calls averaged four to five minutes. 2 24 Bell Atlantic
estimates that its cost for ISP lines for 1996 was $30 million, while its
5
revenue from those circuits was $8 million.22
If carriers have excess transmission and switching capacity, there is
no problem with having flat rates for Internet access because the marginal cost of carrying traffic is zero. 2 26 However, some carriers are exper-

iencing overloads and brownouts because of Internet use, 22 7 and their
networks need to be upgraded to handle this heavier use. 2 28

In addition, as described above, ISPs use local business lines to allow their customers to call into their service to be connected with the
Internet. Since local customers are not charged for calls they receive
(terminating access) but only those that they originate (originating access), ISPs need only pay the flat business rate for a line. The flat business rate does not cover the larger terminating access costs that an ISP
imposes on the telephone network. ISPs pay 4.5% of the equivalent perminute rate paid by IXCs for arguably the same service. 2 29 If ISPs do
not cover their costs, the costs must be absorbed by the customers of the
telephone companies. Many telephone company customers cannot afford
a computer. Thus, if ISPs fail to cover their costs, those who cannot afford computers pay for the costs of the network by paying higher tele223. Leslie Cauley, PacTel to Become First Regional Bell to Offer Unlimited Access to
Internet, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1996, at A3.

224. Timothy K. Stevens & James E. Sylvester, Superhighway Traffic Taxes Current
LEC Networks (visited Mar. 28, 1997) <http'//www.ba.com/ea/fcc/article.htm>.
225. Id.
226. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 101.
227. There are several proposals for how Internet access could be priced to solve the
efficiency problems discussed here including applying congestion pricing theory, overprovisioning capacity, using real-time pricing, offering multiple qualities of service, or using
peak-load prices. Analysis of these pricing theories is beyond the scope of this paper but
some excellent work on the topic has been done. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 102;
C.f. Mackie-Mason & Varian, supra note 123, at 269; Scott Shenker, Service Models And
PricingPoliciesForAn IntegratedServices Internet,in PuBLIC AccEss TO THE INTERNET 315

(Brian Kahin & James Keller eds., 1995).
228. Internet Gridlock is Getting Worse: Bottlenecks are expected to increase, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 15, 1996, at B1-B2.
229. Stevens & Sylvester, supra note 224.
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phone bills to subsidize those who can afford computers. 23 0
Currently, the FCC is studying the impact of ISPs on the public
switched telephone network. 2 3 1 In the meantime, the FCC has concluded
that the exemption from access charges should remain in place until the
23 2
FCC's new access charge system is fully implemented.
The ISPs' legal and policy arguments in the access charge context
are similar to those they make regarding whether they should be subject
to Universal Service obligations. Those arguments are analyzed in the
section below.
2. Applying Universal Service Obligations to ISPs
The key issue in both the access charge and Universal Service proceedings is whether ISPs should be treated like telecommunications carriers and should be required to pay for their costs and to support
Universal Service. ISPs make two main arguments why they should not
be subject to Universal Service obligations: (1) that they are not covered
by the text of the 1996 Act, and (2) that applying Universal Service obligations to ISPs will stunt the growth of the Internet. However, these
arguments are flawed, and two stronger arguments can be made for ending the ISP exemption. First, due to the convergence of technologies currently occurring, the FCC should develop a coherent standard for all
entities that carry information on the network. Second, if the ISP exemption is maintained, new forms of bypass will be encouraged, and the
system will face the same problems it faced with bypass before the 1996
Act.
The ISPs' arguments regarding the text and intent of the 1996 Act
center around the definitions of terms. The 1996 Act requires "All providers of telecommunications services" 23 3 and "Every telecommunications
carrier that provides interstate telecommunications services" 2 34 to contribute to Universal Service.
ISPs argue that they are not providers of interstate telecommunications services and therefore should not be required to contribute to Universal Service support mechanisms. 23 5 The 1996 Act defines
telecommunications as "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in
230.
Service
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

In re Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced
Providers, supra note 210.
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
Access Charge First Report and Order, supra note 75, at 344.
47 U.S.C. § 254(bX4) (1997).
47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (1997).
Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at $ 782.
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the form or content of the information as sent and received." 2 36 ISPs assert that on-line informational and Internet services do not meet the definition of "telecommunications" because users do not choose the
destination of the information or the travel path when information is dynamically routed through the Internet; users do not choose the content of
the information that is sent when they engage in functions such as
browsing a World Wide Web page; and ISPs change the content and form
of the information through the use of protocols and headers. 23 7
ISPs also argue that the 1996 Act confirms their assertion that ISPs
do not provide "telecommunications services" because it distinguishes
"information services" from "telecommunications services" in section
254(h)(2). 2 38 Section 254(h)(2)(A) states:
(2) Advanced services.-The Commission shall establish competitively
neutral rules(A) to enhance, to the extent technically feasible and economically reasonable, access to advanced telecommunications and information services for all public and nonprofit elementary and
secondary 39 school classrooms, health care providers, and
2
libraries.
ISPs argue that this distinction between information and telecommunications services is based on the FCC's basic and enhanced service
distinction. 2 40 While these definitional distinctions may or may not be
technically correct, the increasing convergence of technologies makes
these old FCC distinctions unworkable in either case.
There are many cases of convergence in information and communications technologies. For instance, cable television operators are beginning to offer Internet access; 2 4 1 publishers are incorporating CD-ROMs
as additions to bound titles; newspapers are publishing on the World
Wide Web;2 4 2 and LECs are offering video dialtone systems. 24 3
236. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (1997). The 1996 Act also defines telecommunications carrier
and telecommunicationsservice. Telecommunications carrier is defined as "any provider of
telecommunications services... A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.. ." 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (1997). Telecommunications service is defined as
"the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of
users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used."
47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (1997).
237. Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at 1 782.
238. Id.
239. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(2XA) (1997).
240. See supra Section IV(A).
241. Harry A. Jessell, High Speed Modems a Top Priority,BROADCASTnqG & CABLE, Dec.
4, 1995, at 82.
242. GELSTER, supra note 121, at 591.
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This convergence is occurring partially because of the growing use of
digital technology. Digital technology erases the boundaries that separate the telephone, computer, and media industries. 244 Digital communications use only two electrical voltages. These voltages represent the
binary values used in computers, ones and zeros. Photos, text, audio,
and video can all be digitized by being converted into these two voltages.
Since the Internet transmits digital packets, it can transmit any of these
digitized items over the same lines used for telephone conversations. To
network equipment, these digitized items are indistinguishable.
The future holds more convergence. We may be moving to unified
messaging for voice, email, and fax. 24 5 Or, in the future a single cable
may enter homes for telephone, cable television, and computer use. That
cable may connect to a device that contains a multiplexer which sends
voice to the telephone, television signals to the television, and research
to the computer. 24 6 Netscape Communications Corporation Chairman
Jim Clark has even predicted that the Internet will eliminate conventional telephones. 24 7 No one knows what the outcome of this convergence will be. In the meantime, but some technologies should not be
given false advantages over others through regulatory distinctions. All
technologies should support Universal Service equally.
The FCC has realized that disti.4ctions between technologies are difficult. It originally tried distinguishing between "data processing" and
"telecommunications" and found that distinction unworkable. 24s It currently attempts to distinguish between basic and enhanced services.
Under this approach, audio sent in packets would not be regulated, but
audio sent over the same lines in circuit-switched form would be regulated. This arbitrary distinction makes no sense.
As technologies that have been separate converge, the lines between
"basic" and "enhanced" services, which have never been clear, become
increasingly arbitrary. 24 9 Convergence requires a new unified approach.
The best long-term approach for the FCC would be to impose the same
obligations on all entities that transmit anything over the network.
Under this approach, ISPs would be subject to Universal Service obliga243. Daniel Gonzalez, Accelerating Beyond the On-Ramp: Telephone Company Entry
onto the Information Superhighway Through Video Dialtone, 1 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 7
(1995).
244. Mark Landler, Haves and Have-Nots Revisited, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 1995, at D4.
245. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 91.
246.

MORLEY

& GELBER,

supra note 124, at 72.

247. Judy Brown, Internet can Carry Long-Distance Phone Chats Now, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, April 15, 1996, at 10.

248. Computer II, supra note 202.
249. KELOGG ET AL., supra note 12, at 583.
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tions like all other entities that transmit anything over the network for
their customers.
In addition to their definitional distinction arguments, ISPs also argue that additional charges will stunt growth of Internet. 25 0 There is a
legitimate concern that regulating a new technology at an inappropriate
stage in its initial development may hinder something that would benefit
society. However, with the Internet, many of the social benefits have
been obtained; we already have the technology and standards necessary
to have a workable Internet. Currently, the Internet is in the deployment stage where more people are gaining access to it. While having to
contribute to Universal Service may increase prices and slow deployment, it would not make the Internet disappear.
In addition, the longer the ISP's "temporary" exemption lasts, the
more difficult it becomes to eliminate it because those who benefit from it
fight to keep it. The ISPs have been exempt for eleven years. Although
ISPs are fighting to maintain their exemption, it is time for ISPs to be
treated like all other technologies on the network.
All service providers who benefit from the network should pay for
2
it. 51 As one comment to the Joint Board on Universal Service noted,
"[a] few taking a different view obviously are trying to carve out an exception that would serve their commercial self-interest without regard
25 2
for the public interest or the Act."

Further, if ISPs are not required to contribute to Universal Service,
there is a danger that the bypass problems of the past will be repeated.
The 1996 Act tries to solve the bypass problem by requiring all telecommunications carriers to contribute to Universal Service. 25 3 However,
any type of carrier that can get an exemption from this requirement will
have a new opportunity for bypass. This could encourage customers to
use economically inefficient messaging options. 2 54 A broad funding base
for Universal Service would ensure that no non-contributor could gain an
advantage over a competitor who is a contributor. 2 55
250. Universal Service Recommended Decision, supra note 36, at T 782.
251. In re the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Comments of America's
CarriersTelecommunicationAssociation, CC Docket No. 96-45 (on file with THE JOHN MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER & INFO. L.); In re the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Comments of Fred Williamson & Associates, Inc., CC Docket No. 96-45 (on file with
THE JOHN MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER & INFO. L.).

252. In re the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Reply Comments of
Ameritech, CC Docket No. 96-45 (on file with Tha JOHN MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER & INFO.
L.).
253. 47 U.S.C. § 254(bX4) (1997).
254. ANDERSON ET AL, supra note 9, at xx.
255. In re the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Comments of the United
States Telephone Association, CC Docket No. 96-45 (on file with THE JOHN MARSHALL J. OF
COMPUTER & INFO. L.).
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If the FCC allows the ISP exemption to continue, it will encourage
bypass of a new kind and society will face new bypass problems. The
ISPs' exemption from having to pay access charges and Universal Service obligations creates incentives to use the Internet instead of the telephone. For example, electronic mail traveling from user A to user B
would not be subject to access charges or Universal Service obligations
but a telephone call going from user A to user B would be subject to access charges and Universal Service obligations, even though both use the
same resources (local and long distance lines) and accomplish the same
function (communicating an idea).
Ideally, a consumer's choice of messaging service should be based on
economic costs and not on regulatory distinctions. 25 6 As economists
would say, the optimal combination of services is that combination which
would result from individual consumers choosing commodities priced at
true costs of production in perfectly competitive markets. 2 57 If we want
an optimal combination of services, we must ensure that ISPs are paying
for the costs they are causing. 258 Due to its current exemption from access charges and Universal Service, an ISP pays 12% of what long distance carriers pay for a comparable local connection. 25 9 This price
differential creates opportunities for bypass and should be eliminated by
the FCC.
This price differential also explains the bypass of the public switched
telephone network which is already occurring with Internet phone
("Iphone") products. Iphone software allows a user to make a long distance or international call over the Internet without paying long distance
or international charges. Calls over the Internet are inexpensive because ISPs are exempt from access charges and Universal Service
obligations.
The first Iphone software was introduced in early 1995.260 There
are now over twenty Iphone software products. 2 6 1 To use these products,
a user needs the software (which costs about $50 to $100), a modem, a
256. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 109.
257. Bolter, supra note 48, at 64.
258. See supra Section IV(A).

259. Letter from Alan Ciamporcero, Pac Bell Vice President for Federal Regulatory Affairs, to FCC Common Carrier Bureau chief James Schlicting in Mark Walsh, The Internet
Free-For-All:Efforts To Regulate Software That Turns A PC Into A Telephone Are Meeting
Quiet, But Effective, Opposition, THE RECORDER, July 19, 1996 at 11.
260. Internetphone carrierscriticized: Small Firms want FCC to regulatenew product,

WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1996.
261. The Internet Telephony Consortium (visited Mar. 30, 1997) <http'/itel.mit.edu/>.
Examples include WebPhone by Netspeak Corporation, see < http'/www.itelco.com/> (visited Mar. 28, 1997) and Internet Phone by VocalTec, Inc., see <httpJ/www.vocaltec.com>
(visited Mar. 28, 1997).
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sound card, a microphone, and speakers. 26 2 Iphone software products
digitize the user's voice, convert it into packets, and send the packets
over Internet. 26 3 Iphone software must include audio compression capa2 64
bilities because audio takes much more bandwidth than text.

The availability of Iphone products represents a significant threat of
bypass. The Internet community views Iphone products as valuable.
Microsoft and Netscape 26 5 are both including Iphone software in the new
versions of their Internet browsers. Netscape Navigator has an installed
26 6
base of 25 to 30 million and Microsoft has several million customers.
ISPs including America Online and CompuServe 26 7 are also offering
268
Iphone capabilities.
Some people argue that Iphone software is not a threat because: (1)
the equipment needed is expensive; (2) Iphone calls lack privacy because
they can be intercepted; (3) the sound quality is low and the delays are
too annoying; (4) and the lack of standardization between Iphone products makes each product much less useful because a user can only call
users who own the same brand of Iphone software. As described below,
none of these problems will prove overwhelming to Iphone products. So,
Iphones pose a significant threat as a new way to bypass the public
switched telephone network.
First, consider the expense of the Iphone equipment. In October
1996, International Discount Telecommunications ("IDT") announced
that it plans to release a new technology that allows calls over the Internet using a traditional telephone on each end of the call. 26 9 To use

IDT's new product, users call a toll free number, a switch server converts
the call to the packet switched network, the user enters an account
number and the number he or she wishes to call, and the call travels over
the Internet and is converted back to the telephone network. 270 Thus,
soon the equipment will not even be needed, so its expense will be
irrelevant.
262. Steve Rosenthal, Net Success, MACUSER, May 1996, at 72.
263. How Web Phones Work, (visited Dec. 10, 1996) <http'//www.cnet.com/Reviews/
Compare/Webphone/ss04.html>.
264. Id.
265. Ric Manning, The Web goes Ro1I Aczzv , COURIER-J., Apr. 13, 1996, at 12S.
266. The Internet Telephony Consortium (visited Mar. 30, 1997) <http'/itel.mit.edu/>.
267. Manning, supra note 265.
268. See Internetphone carrierscriticized: Small Firms want FCC to regulate new product, WASH. PosT, Mar. 9, 1996; C.f Barbara Darrow, Telcos, Developers Spar over Voice on
the Internet, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Apr. 8, 1996, at 57; John Simons, Wrestling over
the future, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 15, 1996, at 53.
269. IDT Announces Plans to Release Phone-to-Phone Technology Via the Internet (last
modified Oct. 1, 1996) <http://www.idt.net/10-1-96.html>.
270. Id.
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Second, privacy problems can be solved using encryption. PGPfone is
Iphone software that allows users to encrypt their conversations using
271
Pretty Good Privacy ("PGP"), a popular encryption product.
Third, the sound quality and delays will be improved and will not
deter people if the price for calls is low enough. The current delay in
receiving audio using Iphones ranges from a fraction of a second to several seconds. 2 72 If a computer contains a full duplex sound board, the
delay is shorter because it can record and play at the same time. 2 73 In
addition, Vocaltec is developing Iphone software compatible with cable
modems which would also greatly reduce delay.2 7 4 Cellular telephones
offer lower quality than traditional telephones. Thus, the growth in the
cellular telephone industry demonstrates that people are willing to give
up a significant level of quality in exchange for other benefits. 2 75 The
27 6
benefit of using an Iphone is its vastly lower price.
Fourth, standards are being developed which will allow users of different Iphone products to call one another. Currently, to use most
Iphone products, both parties need to be on-line and must be running the
same Iphone software. 2 77 However, a standardization project is underway in MIT's Research Program on Communication's Policy. 2 78 The project, the Internet Telephony Interoperability Consortium, is focusing on
providing interoperability between the Internet and the public switched
27 9
telephone network and among Iphone applications.
The threat of bypass using Iphones should be taken seriously. In the
past, people have been wrong about the future of technology. For instance, Western Union Telegraph Company (the owner of the telegraph
system in the 1800s) rejected an early offer to purchase Alexander Graham Bell's patents on the telephone saying that the product had no potential. 2 80 Iphones could represent the future of voice communication,
especially with the convergence between computers and telecommunications that is occurring now.
271. Jim Rapoza, Internet Phones Still Need to Lose Rough Edges, PC

WEEK,

Apr. 15,

1996, at N05.
272. How Web Phones Work, supra note 263.
273. Robert A. Hickling, Internet Telephony: A Technical Discussion (visited Jan. 25,
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To avoid a new form of bypass, carriers of Iphone calls should be
subject to the same requirements as telecommunications carriers. However, the only ways to regulate Iphones is to either ban Iphone software
281
or to regulate ISPs.

Shortly after Iphones were introduced, the FCC was asked to ban
the sale of Iphone software. On March 4, 1996, a group called America's
Carriers Telecommunication Association ("ACTA") petitioned the FCC to
ban the sale of IPhone software. 28 2 ACTA's members are independent
long distance telephone companies. 28 3 Its members generally buy long
distance service from wholesaler carriers and sell it at a discount, largely
to businesses.
In its petition to the FCC, ACTA argued that Iphone software providers are carriers under the 1996 Act 28 4 and should be subject to the

same regulatory restraints to which other telecommunications carriers
are subject. 2 85 The problem with this argument is that ISPs, rather
286
than the Iphone software providers, provide transmission service.
ACTA also argued that Iphones are bypass products and contribute
nothing to the infrastructure they use. 2 87 The FCC has traditionally allowed bypass technologies without subjecting them to the same requirements as monopoly telecommunications carriers. However, under the
1996 Act, this has changed. All telecommunications carriers are subject
28 8
to Universal Service obligations now.

Banning Iphone software would cause several problems. If it
banned Iphone software, the FCC would also have to ban videoconferencing and non-real time voice over the Internet. If these products were
banned, social welfare could be reduced. Iphone software adds value in
two ways: (1) speech compression saves bandwidth, and (2) packet
switching allows for efficient use of telephone lines. 28 9 Also, these products are already available, so the only way to enforce a ban would be to
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check the hard drive of every American. 29 0 Thus, a ban does not seem
appropriate. However, the transmission of voice conversations using
Iphone software should be subject to the same regulations as the transmissions of voice conversations using the traditional phone system. It
makes no sense that these two types of conversation could occur over the
very same lines and yet be treated quite differently by regulators.
The FCC will likely decide not to ban Iphone products. Reed Hundt,
the Chairman of the FCC, has indicated in speeches that he is strongly
inclined not to ban Iphone software. 2 9 1 Theoretically, the FCC could require ISPs to charge different prices for using Iphone software over the
Internet to cover the access charges and Universal Service obligations.
However, the problem with this approach is that ISPs cannot distinguish
bits of voice from bits of data. 292 Both voice and data are digitized and

look like ones and zeros to the computers on the Internet. Thus, the only
way the FCC can regulate Iphones to prevent bypass is to regulate ISPs.
As described above, this should be done by charging ISPs the same access charges and Universal Service charges as other carriers on the network. This would eliminate incentives for inefficient bypass because all
entities that transmit information of any kind over the network would
contribute. Users would be encouraged to choose the most cost-effective
technology for communication and would not be lured into choosing a
socially inefficient communication technology because of prices based on
regulatory distinctions.
In the Modified Final Judgment, Judge Greene explained when regulation of bypass technologies should occur:
Neither the Court nor those who object to the decree can halt the electronic revolution any more than the Luddites could stop the industrial
revolution at the beginning of the last century. If and when bypass
technology becomes technically and economically feasible for widespread use, it should have the effect of reducing telephone costs and
charges across the board, to the benefit of consumers, the economy, and
the nation. Should it turn out instead that, as some fear, this technology will be used to reduce charges unevenly so as to threaten the goal of
Universal Service, then those with legislative authority may at that
time wish to take steps, through a program of subsidies, special
charges, or other regulatory means, to make the benefits of the new
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technology available to all, including
those who are relatively low-vol2 93
ume users of telephone service.

Iphone software represents a technology that reduces charges unevenly and threatens the goal of Universal Service. The FCC should require ISPs to contribute to Universal Service to ameliorate this threat.
The FCC has indicated that it will hold proceedings on the legal
questions regarding Internet telephony and the continued viability of the
basic/enhanced dichotomy. 2 94 For the reasons stated here, the FCC
should eliminate the basic/enhanced distinction and require ISPs to contribute to Universal Service as all other telecommunications carriers
must.
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet provides exciting new opportunities for Americans.
However, the FCC should not become so enamored with one technology
that it fosters an unjust system where poor telephone users subsidize
wealthy computer users. This can be avoided by requiring ISPs to pay
for the costs they impose on the network and to contribute to the Universal Service fund.
In this new digital age, bits are bits. No technology or service provider should be favored over others. The exemption for ISPs must be
terminated to prevent the bypass problems of the past from becoming the
bypass problems of the future. All those who benefit from Universal Service must contribute to its continued existence.
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